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Abstract: Kosovo`s independence remains one of the most problematic 
aspects of the post-Yugoslav political order, dividing UN members, still in the 
phase of a frozen conflict and marked by the split between Serbia`s 
traditional allies and the supporters of Kosovar independence. As the last 
episode of Yugoslavia`s explosive disintegration, the Kosovo war showed 
how the radicalization inoculated by the nationalist leadership was 
responsible for the biggest humanitarian crisis after the Second World War. 
So profound was the impact of radicalization on society, that almost two 
decades after the last bullet was fired, the on-site reality is still determined 
by ethnic grudges. The prospect of EU integration, now the only common 
desideratum of the former enemies, could be considered an incentive for 
reconciliation. However, nationalistic outbreaks still reanimate the desire for 
retaliation, thereby slowing down the process of Europeanisation, especially 
for Kosovo, which still does not have any legally established EU ascension 
path.  
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Introduction 
 
The study addresses the influence that the Kosovo-Serbia binomial 
has had on the regional security architecture in the Western Balkans and 
analyses in a comparative manner the two stages of relations between 
Belgrade and Pristina, namely autonomy and independence. The first section 
deals with the post-conflict reconstruction of the ex-Yugoslav space, focusing 
on Kosovo`s status, but above all on the redefinition of power relations 
between the central authority and the regional administration. 
The paper also covers the period preceding the adoption of Kosovo's 
Declaration of Independence, presenting Montenegrin separatism as a 
precedent for the irredentism from southern Serbia and for the formation of 
the Republic of Kosovo. On this occasion, the article pursues the 
international debate on the self-determination of the province, focusing on 
the nuances between the Euro-Atlantic community and the traditional allies 
of Serbia. The legality of the argument is deduced from the strategies of the 
interested parties that exercised influence in the South-Eastern European 
space. As such, the friction points during the confrontation were transposed 
into the post-conflict phase and the act of independence was the catalyst for 
an East-West rupture in terms of the perspective on the principle of self-
determination.  
At macro-structural level, the study exposes the post-Cold War 
transformation of the former the Yugoslav space. Conceptually, the Kosovo 
war can be considered one of the first conflicts to be fought within the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which has become part of customary 
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international law in modern times. On the other hand, the violation of a UN 
state’s sovereignty as a result of a military intervention unauthorized under a 
resolution issued by the Security Council would provide support for the 
hypothesis that the status of Kosovo is illegitimate. Practically, albeit the 
humanitarian intervention was tacitly accepted by the UN Security Council, 
no official statement was issued giving permission for NATO’s intervention 
in Yugoslavia. Contrarily, the text of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1199 / 1998 stipulates that “further actions and additional 
measures” could be used in case negotiations with Belgrade fail, thus 
providing a carte blanche for the military operation.1 
 
The Little Yugoslavia and the Last Episode of Balkan Federalism  
  
 Balkanization  could be undeniably considered the leitmotif of the 
fragmentation movements in South-Eastern Europe and fueled by the same 
nationalist energies that had been reinforced during the breakup of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. The heritage of the interwar, this fight of 
the Balkan people for building state entities based on ethnic criteria, proved 
its applicability both to the Yugoslav Wars from the `90s but also to the post-
Yugoslav order by impacting the collective mentality and the political 
discourses.  
 From a certain point of view, from a European perspective, the `90s 
could be called the Yugoslav decade, practically an entire period that was 
                                                          
1 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1199 (1998), September 23rd, 1998, available 
at https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199(1998), accessed on April 28th, 2018.  
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marked by the unprecedented violence on the continent, only comparable to 
the drama of the Second World War. The revival of Balkanization 
transformed the last decade of the 20th century in the 3rd interwar decade, at 
least in the Western Balkans: the entire political and social climate was 
marred by ideology, ethnic grudges and war without fronts. Once again, the 
Europeans saw the smoking guns in the south, together with the fear of 
conflict escalation at a regional or continental scale.   
Only four years after the war in Kosovo, the post-conflict 
reconstruction would bring to light the first problems in terms of Yugoslavia`s 
domestic cohesion, especially because Vojislav Koštunica`s term was a 
continuation of Slobodan Milošević 's nationalism, even if it was more 
moderate in nature, as imposed by the era. The informal failure of 
Yugoslavism was already part of recent history, as the entire former Yugoslav 
territory was covered by successoral republics, widely recognized by the 
international community, together with an autonomous province with a quasi-
protectorate status. The domestic evolutions within Yugoslavia were to take 
place in the opposite direction of the "supranationalisation of identity"2 
produced within the European Union, having Yugoslavia`s political fracture 
as an irrefutable evidence. 
Rump Yugoslavia officially ceased to exist following the conservative 
amendment operated by the Serbian Parliament on February 4th, 2003, the 
new entity bearing the name Srbija I Crna Gora (Serbia and Montenegro). 
The ratio of forces between the two constituent republics would be that of 
                                                          
2 Sergiu Gherghina, Vasile Boari, “Multidisciplinary approaches of an old policy”, in: Sergiu 
Gherghina, Vasile Boari (eds.), Recovering the National Identity, Iași, Polirom Publishing 
House, p. 17. 
RJHIS 5 (1) 2018  
 
 
 
37 
 
bicephalous entities, reunited at the level of the central bureaucratic apparatus 
and based on confederal principles. The Serbo-Montenegrin Union was 
scheduled to have Belgrade as a capital-city; otherwise, it was designed as a 
parliamentary union, only sharing the Presidency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Defence.   
The component republics had equal rights, an autonomous internal 
administrative structure, with their own legislative and executive structures. 
This state of affairs was a consequence of the deterioration of relations 
between Belgrade and Podgorica during the Kosovo war when the attitude of 
the two sister republics was fundamentally divergent – the Montenegrin's 
benevolent neutrality towards NATO was one of the pressure points in the 
relations with the Serbian side. The Kosovo conflict paved the way for the 
first rivalries between the Serbian and the Montenegrin security forces.   
A potential schism of the Southern Slavs was set out in the following 
statement regarding the foundations of the State Union between Serbia and 
Montenegro – “a political and state construction created during a certain 
geopolitical conjuncture, with the support and the pressure of the European 
Union, interested in creating this federation. [...] The pressure was mainly 
exerted over the decision-makers from Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, 
forced to accept the creation of a mini-Yugoslavia".3 The previous statement 
is meant to illustrate the systemic vulnerabilities of the Union, as the 
noticeable differences between Belgrade and Podgorica marked the 
emergence of serious disagreements, therefore the first signs of divergence 
                                                          
3 Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, History, Geopolitics and Espionage in the Western 
Balkans: the Origins, the Evolution and the Activity of the Intelligence Structures in the 
Ethno-Geographic Space of the Southern Slavs: Yugoslavia versus Romania in the Shadow 
War, Baia Mare, Proema Publishing House, 2009, p. 194. 
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were only a matter of time. The quasi-artificial character of the Serbian-
Montenegrin Union project was inherent in its provisional condition and the 
superficial character of its internal cohesion. 
Divergent views manifested since laying the groundwork for the 
future state project led to the inclusion of an emergency clause in the treaty 
establishing the Union: a referendum threshold of 55% for validation, 
definable three years later when Balkanization would once again become the 
regional reality. Once relations between Belgrade and Podgorica showed 
signs even of a temporary stabilization, Serbia focused on managing the issue 
of national minorities, as the Albanian community was the most problematic 
component of an ethnic mix that encouraged both irredentism and 
secessionism. 
The Union of Serbia and Montenegro – with the ruling legacy of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – largely implemented the policies of post-
Titoist Yugoslav federalism, thus increasing the control of minorities by 
"putting ethnic leadership into dependence, removing the inconvenient 
elements of the official policy and countering identities".4 What the New York 
Times described in its issue from December 3rd, 1990 as a repeat of the 
Pakistan-India 1947 divisions5 as the background for Yugoslavia`s breakup 
was confirmed by the reciprocity of the persecution operated against the 
minorities by the majorities of the two republics. 
‘The smoke curtain’ used by the leadership from Belgrade for this 
new offensive against national minorities was the resolution adopted by 
                                                          
4 Ibidem, p. 187. 
5 Robert M. Hayden, From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans: studies of a European 
disunion, 1991-2011, Leidn & Boston, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013, p. x. 
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Parliament on August 27th, 2004, recognizing Kosovo`s autonomy within 
Serbia. Largely fitted into the formalist trend of the era, the decision was 
temporized up to the moment when the effects only applied de jure; the de 
facto situation was extremely different compared to what the political actors 
declared, characterized by the gap between the four formal components of 
the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the tensions leading to discontent both 
at domestic and union level – the traditional tensions between Belgrade and 
Pristina were duplicated by those between Belgrade and Podgorica. 
The political elite from Belgrade, adopting the position of a "cultural 
decontamination center",6 took over the only Messianic component from 
Yugoslavism – turning into a bridgehead for South Slavs, but completely 
circumventing the idea of "recognizing tolerance and diversity".7 The status 
of Albanians – traditionally marked by an "ambiguous position in a state self-
affirmed by Southern Slavs"8 – had become increasingly difficult to define, 
being disputed by military means as a result. The problem had become more 
pressing as the respite sustained by allied military presence had not led to the 
desired effect of reconciliation, especially as the tensions during the conflict 
continued – and even degenerated – in a latent stage. 
The 1999 war inoculated some systemic malfunctions to the 
reconstruction process, such as the blockade after the first guerrilla troops 
appeared in Kosovo. Both in conceptual and experiential terms, a liberation 
movement is the supreme argument that the population from a territory is not 
                                                          
6 Viorel Roman, The Transition. From the Revolution in Romania, 1989 to the Yugoslav War, 
1999, Bucharest, Europa Nova Publishing House, 2000, p. 22. 
7 Andrew Baruch Wachtel, The Balkans: A History of Diversity and Harmony, Bucharest, 
Corinth Publishing House, 2017, p. 179. 
8 Ibidem, p. 179.  
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going to accept a return to status quo ante bellum. By invoking the right of 
self-determination,9 the movement precisely exposed the irreconcilable 
character of the relations between the capital city and the region, but 
especially the failure of the negotiated solution, even rejecting the idea of 
extended autonomy or confederalism. 
Peculiar to the post-1999 interactions between Belgrade and Pristina 
is the trinomial phobos – kerdos – doxa,10 Greek language terms describing 
fear, personal interest and the desire to grow. Adapting the conceptual 
philosophy of Thucydides to the regional and strategic climate, the 
relationship between Serbia and Kosovo at the end of the conflict can be 
characterized by ambivalence, oscillating between fear and interest, since 
concessions involved mutually accepted vulnerabilities and the stimulation 
of separatism. For both actors, the desirability of the Euro-Atlantic 
integration was overcome by national interests, often inconsistent with the 
cosmopolitanism of the new century that debuted under the desideratum of 
"the moral unity of humanity".11  
The Balkanization inherited from the post-imperial era was 
overlapped – this time – both by the bankruptcy of Post-Leninism and 
Yugoslavia and replaced by personal authoritarianism12 as a form of 
                                                          
9 Robert M. Hayden, op. cit., p. 119.   
10 George Cristian Maior, The New Ally. Rethinking the Foreign and Defense Policy of 
Romania, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2012, p. 51. 
11 Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, “Identities and Political Communities”, in: Daniel Biró (ed.), 
Contemporary international relations: central themes in world politics, Iași, Polirom 
Publishing House, 2013, p. 51.  
12 National Archives and Records Administration, Kettering Foundation, Advise the 
President: William J. Clinton. What Should the United States Do About the Kosovo Crisis?, 
William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum, 1999, available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sitesusa/wp-content/uploads/sites/402/2016/11/clinton-
kosovo.pdf, accessed on April 28th, 2018, p. 4. 
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accommodation after decades exercising the paternalist socialist state. The 
challenge was overwhelmingly complicated by the fact that the subordinate 
approach of the dispute turned into recourse to "unprecedented cruelty in 
Europe after 1945",13 so that zero-sum games represented the rule, with the 
exception of episodic events, which were especially inconsistent in terms of 
the impact they had. The distorted image of alterity corroborated with this 
approach in the optics of each side and led to societal cleavages impossible 
to blur, as the martial experience became decisive: "war breaks your 
existence in two pieces."14 
A suitable characterization of the state of affairs could be that outlined 
by Hans J. Morgenthau, which traces the coordinates of the present era, 
describing a "world where states, acting on their own interests, are fighting 
for power and peace".15 The struggle for safeguarding interests is manifested 
in the Kosovo-Serbia relationship by the predominance of security issues; the 
threat of war was a leitmotif of the relation between the two actors. As a 
consequence, in the medium and long term, the security issues – and the 
geostrategic combinations designed to achieve them – led to the 
peripheralization of the international organizations in the area, especially in 
the early post-conflict years, when the parties were less willing to engage in 
concession policies, equating concession with conciliation. 
                                                          
13 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic 
History, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, 2010, p. 269. 
14 Slavenka Drakulić, Balkan Express. The Unseen Face of the War, Bucharest, Athena 
Publishing House, 1997, p. 16. 
15 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Iași, Polirom Publishing 
House, 2009, p. 78. 
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The doctrine of popular sovereignty, originating in the 18th century, is 
a central point for Kosovo's self-determination, especially in the case of an 
overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian majority: according to official statistics 
from 1993, the Albanians represented a majority of 85.6% in Kosovo. From 
the perspective of the absolute dimension of popular sovereignty emerged the 
legitimate right of the Albanians in Kosovo to revolt, at the cost of 
undermining the sovereignty of a state, as expressed by the most legalist 
views. The foundations of the Yugoslav representivity and sovereignty were 
questioned precisely at the time when political decision-makers were guilty 
of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Following the pattern of counter-revolution 
that further exacerbated the energies of the movement, Belgrade's ethnic 
discrimination made nothing but provide a richer pro-independence argument 
to its Pristina counterpart. 
The problem of Serbia’s reconfirmation of autonomy in 2004 was that 
it was accepted only when the confrontation had already been completed – 
14 years after the first requests in this respect, when, for the Albanian 
Kosovars, the return under Belgrade's authority was the least desirable 
scenario. The considerable amount of support for the pro-independence 
agenda was ultimately determined by the organized violence only applied by 
the Yugoslav regime, as the scourge of war far outstripped a strictly martial 
component and even reached mass-executed sexual violence. The desire to 
build trust, ultimately the central element of reconciliation strategies, had 
been halted because of the difficulties in persuading the victims of violence 
about their former aggressor's intentions. 
The recurrence of war was a major concern in the debates on the 
preservation of the ex-Yugoslav status quo. Belgrade's realpolitik paved 
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under Milošević and continued by Koštunica borrowed the logic of Nicholas 
J. Spykman: "a world without struggle would be a world in which life ceased 
to exist".16 Basically, the situation between Kosovo and Serbia was edified 
on mutual suspicions, both camps circumspect about the good intentions of 
the other. The notion of state rationality, rarely borne out of amorality, has 
perpetually reintroduced the idea of hidden agendas, but above all the pursuit 
of objectives known only at the level of the Camarillo. 
One should also consider the trust placed in the ability of the 
international community to perform crisis management, of course with 
contradictory amendments regarding the available or usable capabilities. 
From the Serbian point of view, the fact that they had lost control of a territory 
considered the cradle of their civilisation overlapped with an intervention that 
it has always deemed illegitimate because it violated its sovereignty, fuelling 
the hypothesis of a pro-Kosovarian attitude from the West, especially since 
Montenegro's benevolent neutrality towards NATO could not be denied. For 
the Albanians from Kosovo, the fact that the war ended with an international 
protectorate meant that either the West had no direct interests to defend in the 
region or that the reality was that of a pro-Yugoslav attitude. 
As a major consequence, the inter-confessional opposition, 
corroborated with the traumas of the past, was decisive for Serbia in seeking 
a strategic path towards the Aegean and Adriatic seas with the revitalization 
of nationalism in support of the Greater Serbia project. The problem of 
Kosovo, the territory evoked in Belgrade's philosophical statements at the 
                                                          
16 Bruce Bueno de Mersquita, “Logic and Evidence of Neorealism: When It's a False 
Theory?”, in: John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, Realism and Power Balance: A New Debate, 
Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2012, p. 42.  
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intersection of West-European and North-Atlantic economic interests, 
persisted in being one of the hottest points of any regional geopolitical 
equation. In spite of this, the focus of international opinion fell on the 
Montenegrin issue, whose resurgence seemed inevitable, as the clash 
between Belgrade and Podgorica threatened the integrity of one of the 
youngest states in the region. 
The referendum from May 22nd, 2006, demonstrated the incompatible 
positions between Belgrade and Pristina, 55.4% of the Montenegrin citizens 
opting for separation from Serbia. The peaceful secession17 was valid, 
exceeding the 55% threshold imposed by the constitutional treaty. The 
question determining Belgrade's eminently peaceful actions was answered 
only when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia organized a similar 
referendum. Beyond the Serbian leadership`s desire for a new direction, one 
must bear in mind that two separatist movements of an amplitude such as 
Kosovo and Montenegro could not be managed simultaneously. 
The Euro-Atlantic community`s circumspection related to the 
Montenegrin independence resulted precisely from the fear of offering a new 
precedent to similar movements in Southern Europe. The argument of the 
international community was that the developments from Montenegro could 
produce a domino effect in Kosovo, Macedonia and Republika Srpska, which 
added concerns about similar effects in Catalonia or Flanders. The ratification 
of the independence act of the youngest post-Yugoslav actors was 
characterized in the most vehement terms: "The European Union recognized 
the independence of the small Balkan state, although almost all of the 
                                                          
17 Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, op. cit., p. 195.  
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continental states did not see that, which can lead to a reaction in the Western 
Balkans, and even in the rest of Europe."18 
The collapse that occurred just three years after the establishment of 
the Serbian-Montenegrin Union project, anticipated to some extent with the 
Balkanisation, revitalized in the early 1990s, was an implacable process, with 
the creation of smaller, but more coherent ethnic entities. Although the "states 
are relatively time-consuming homeostasis structures",19 the disintegration of 
the Union precisely demonstrated the logic that Keohane exposed on the 
triple dimension of national interests – physical survival, autonomy and 
prosperity – materialized in the phrase "life, freedom, ownership".20 The 
interval between 2006 and 2008, and thus between the Montenegrin and 
Kosovar independence statements, was marked by extensive conceptual and 
ideological debates under the imperative that "narrative consciousness 
determines the being of a nation".21 
The Montenegrin separatism, which quickly achieved its goals of 
self-determination, provided the Kosovo movement with an example of 
mobilization, especially with the analogies drawn between the two 
movements: the Yugoslav federalism and, later, the confederal unionism only 
represented strategies to block the separatism promoted by Pristina and 
Podgorica. Since, in spite of the protests and the reactions of the international 
community against the redrawing of borders in South-Eastern Europe, the 
                                                          
18 Ibidem, p. 192.  
19 Alexander Wendt, The Social Theory of International Politics, Iași, Polirom Publishing 
House, 2011, p. 242. 
20 Ibidem, p. 240. 
21 Milica Bakić-Hayden, “National Memory as a Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo”, 
in: Maria Todorova (ed.), Balkan identities: nation and memory, New York, New York 
University Press, 2004, p. 26. 
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Montenegrins had built up their own state, it became obvious that the 
example could only mobilize the energies of the movement in southern 
Serbia. The quasi-poetic approaches to the concept of alterity illustrated how 
the struggle for self-determination, as a nucleus of Balkanization, went 
beyond mental boundaries, together with the emotional burdens related to the 
identification with the homeland and the presentation of the other. 
 
A Couple of Years for Preparing a Chain Reaction  
 
The Kosovar separatism, a study case per se in the area, due to the 
symbiosis between irredentism and secession, brought to the forefront both 
the manifestations and the counter-reactions awakened in the Serbian side, 
the idea of struggle for national emancipation. This desideratum for the 
Romanticism of the 19th century, in conjunction with the doctrine of the air 
forces,22 proved that statehood in South-Eastern Europe was the result of an 
equation between myth and conscience and was overly complicated by 
strategic interests or transnational conflicts. As a result, the theory of identity 
based on jus sanguinis was reaffirmed, including in the context of the fever 
for democracy and international integration. 
A phrase expressed by a Serbian participant in the Second Balkan War 
remained characteristic for the evolution of relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina, following Podgorica`s decision to leave the Union: "My God, what 
has awaited us! Let's see Kosovo released! The spirits of Lazarus, Milos and 
                                                          
22 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War. Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat, Public 
Affairs, New York, 2001, p. 454. 
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all the martyrs in Kosovo are watching us!"23 The illustration of the strategic 
objectives and the complementary nationalist agendas had been achieved 
using some analogies to the cultural peripheralization imposed on the 
minority by the majority and the specific desires of Enlightenment, often 
capable of legitimizing – and even feeding – the liberation struggle, and 
respectively safeguarding territorial integrity. 
The struggle for and against Kosovo`s independence had reanimated 
the convergence of literary, religious and political discourse, even historical 
events which seemed interchangeable, in the context of rendering reality in a 
mirrored optics. It can easily be concluded that the decade between the end 
of the conflict and the proclamation of Kosovo`s independence had been 
marked by the alternation between theories of the "true history of Kosovo" 
and the crystal-clear expressed strategic coordinates. The philosophical 
expositions embraced the leitmotif of the cradle of civilization, largely 
reflected in the writings of Serbian folklorist Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, 
known for his 19th-century epic poems about Kosovo. 
The mythological paradigm evoked by Karadžić in presenting the 
Kosovo conflict as part of the Serbian emancipation struggle was an attempt 
to reiterate Serbia's strategic position as a point of utmost importance, the 
gateway to Central Europe. Thus, the energies of change that animated the 
Kosovar independence movement were presented in analogy with the 
destabilizing impact of the Ottoman presence in the region, but, above all, 
the Kosovo war was linked with the struggle for the emancipation of the 
Serbian people. By invoking a "considerable populist appeal",24 Belgrade 
                                                          
23 Milica Bakić-Hayden, op. cit., p. 28. 
24 Ibidem, p. 28.  
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called for preserving Kosovo beyond strategic and territorial reasons, as an 
ultimate test of Serb persistence in the region, a challenge to reconfirm the 
myth of resistance. 
The region's climate at the time of 2007 was that of the tense 
interactions between Belgrade and Pristina, which put pressure on the 
commissions and missions mandated to manage the Kosovo issue, especially 
as there was no feasible compromise between the agendas of the two capital 
cities. Since the independence of the Montenegrin side had become a reality, 
Kosovo’s return to Serbia's borders, even under a regime of autonomy, was a 
concession that meant abandoning the struggle for self-determination. The 
domino effect hypothesis that the critics of the Montenegrin self-
determination discussed seemed to become more and more viable, which 
inherently implied an adaptation from the European Union as a guarantor of 
the reconstruction of the Western Balkans. 
The immediate consequence of amending the European agenda for 
the Kosovo-Serbia binomial was the adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan on March 
30th, 2007 by the European Parliament. Drafted by former Finnish President 
Marti Ahtisaari and sent to the United Nations, the plan provided for 
Kosovo's "controlled independence",25 thus confirming the hypothesis of the 
domino effect produced by Montenegrin independence. Since the adoption 
of the Plan, eventually, in addition to the assumptions about the self-
determination of Podgorica, the critics of this legal arrangement of 
Balkanization discussed the echoes that an official recognition of separatism 
                                                          
25 Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, op. cit., p. 169. 
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will have on similar movements in Spain, Cyprus, France, Transnistria, 
Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or Ossetia. 
The first article of the document, entitled General Principles, exposed 
the general coordinates of the statehood of Kosovo, those of a "democratic 
society that will be democratically self-governed, respecting the rule of law 
through its legislative, executive and legislative institutions."26 It stipulated 
that territorial claims were forbidden for the future republic – i.e. the actions 
against the integrity of another state – in addition to which we find a 
paragraph discussing the cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina for the 
implementation of this Plan. In order to ensure a peaceful transition from the 
international protectorate to the statehood of Kosovo, the document prepared 
by the former Finnish head of state provided for the establishment of an 
international guarantee, given the latent conflicts between the two actors. 
However, the influences of the "double dimension conferred by 
Yugoslavism"27 remained a constant, a constitutional lever to counteract the 
revanchist nationalism and the effect of the ethnic division of power. The 
decentralization proposed by the Yugoslav federalist project was capable of 
neutralizing any manifestation of the assimilationist policies, while the 
Ahtisaari Plan itself provided, ex officio, 20 seats for minority rights, out of 
which 10 were reserved for the Serb minority. The mechanism, beyond the 
logic of implementing the established model that brought peace to the region 
between 1918 and 1989, involved a representation that was independent of 
                                                          
26 Marti Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement, February 2nd, 
2007, 
https://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf, 
accessed on April 29th, 2018, p. 3. 
27 Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, op. cit, p. 51. 
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the will of the ethnic majority, precisely to equip the new state with the 
minority autonomy assurances that Yugoslavia renounced after 1989.  
The balance of power generated the same regional manifestation of 
the interpenetration between secessionism and irredentism, so the dilemma 
of the international community involved conferring autonomy to the Serb 
minority without dismantling Kosovo`s internal coherence.  The strategy was 
largely reminiscent of the Middle East peace process – the challenge 
essentially the same: managing the situation to such an extent that the 
proposed measures would not lead to the antagonism of any of the actors. 
The perception of the serbophile voices was that Kosovo separatists 
were favoured, basically confirming the thesis that post-conflict international 
tutelage was a pathway leading only to independence, Kosovo being lost to 
the Serbs after the international community's decision to manage the territory. 
Although in Belgrade's view, the Ahtisaari Plan meant nothing but the 
confirmation of the pro-Kosovar attitude of the Euro-Atlantic community, for 
Pristina, the idea of supervised independence28 was not entirely satisfactory, 
especially as it alluded to the doctrine of limited sovereignty – a point of 
convergence between the Brezhnev and Rumsfeld doctrines. Although the 
Plan was the ultimate guarantee that the province would no longer return 
within the borders of Serbian sovereignty, the Kosovars’ criticism went in the 
direction that the right to self-determination was conditioned by the 
international administration. 
                                                          
28 Michael Ross Fowler, Julie Marie Bunck, Law, power and the sovereign state: the 
evolution and application of the concept of sovereignty, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania 
University Press, 1995, p. 130. 
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The rationale behind establishing a transitional phase between 
international trusteeship and Kosovo`s self-determination lies in the 
circumspection of the international community regarding the real capacity of 
the Pristina to govern, especially since punctual problems such as economic 
unsustainability represented a major syncope of the future state. Practically, 
the post-conflict reconstruction included setting up an entity capable of 
independently surviving by creating the necessary domestic conditions. In a 
state with its identity linked to warfare, but especially to a nationalist agenda 
with a revanchist potential, the lack of self-financing capacity could only 
raise even more criticism towards its very existence. 
The international regime was conceptually foreseen to diminish the 
impact of the transition, but especially to support and finance the process of 
endowing the future country with the institutional infrastructure for releasing 
pressure: creating a state structure able to manage a multi-ethnic country but 
also an entity capable of legally overcoming the ethnic outbreaks. One can 
distinguish the principle of hub-spoke,29 which, beyond the metaphorical 
component at the level of the public discourse, expounded the idea of a model 
of dependence, thus stimulating the interconnection to such a level that the 
conflict had become so unprofitable that it would have been abandoned.  
The on-site reality also demonstrated the existence of strong 
opposition to changing the regional balance by introducing a new actor into 
the regional configuration, which would bring to light structural defects such 
as relying only on legal sovereignty, namely only on the recognition of a 
state's sovereignty over a territory. This new actor, while supposedly 
                                                          
29 Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., p. 320. 
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officially recognized, did not possess the capacity for self-managing its 
internal affairs, effectively lacking interdependence sovereignty, domestic 
sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.   
The neorealist interpretation of international anarchy, superimposed 
on a regionalism synonymous with the Balkanization, brought the Kosovo-
Serbia binomial into the behavioural paradigm of the prisoner's dilemma. On 
the basis of this principle, the post-Yugoslav reconstruction, so, inherently, 
Kosovo`s independence as well, was governed by the logic that the stimulus 
was not necessarily important, but the frequency of the game: the key of the 
game was not essentially the stimulus, but the idea of not giving up on the 
game. Regarding Belgrade, European integration could hardly have been a 
strong enough incentive since, in the case of Serbia, one could not discuss 
the Atlantic component of integration, given the major opposition to NATO 
after the Yugoslav experiences.  
The regional adaptation, in this case the shadow of the future,30 could 
not be included in the equation when cooperation was the missing element 
and it could not even be talk of desertion since there had been no dialogue on 
which to give up. In this case, the main issue was lacking any type of 
cooperation or common interests, which would have contributed towards 
diminishing the asperities or moderating the interactions between Belgrade 
and Pristina. Practically, there was no common shadow since there was no 
common future for the two actors.  
In addition to the technical components such as reducing the transition 
costs or monitoring and implementing agreements, the idea of a supervised 
                                                          
30 Edward Harrison, The Cold War International System. Strategies, Institutions and 
Reflexivity, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2010, p. 61. 
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independence – inherent in an international regime – was determined by a 
supposed "functional role in facilitating the cooperation between 
international egoists".31 The concept behind the international regime was that 
of reducing the uncertainty, as well as the traditional notion of modelling the 
state's expectations of future behaviour. In contrast to the assumed tasks, it is 
worth mentioning the difficulty of creating the regimes, mainly the problem 
of assuming legal obligations, especially when its objectives were fully 
contested by one party. 
Although dynamic rationalism is an integral part of the post-Yugoslav 
reality, the changing role of the state’s preferences could not be so radical as 
to circumvent the idea of Kosovo as a cradle of civilisation. Whether or not 
to discuss the action of autonomous variables, giving up on one of the 
founding myths of the Serbian people could not be a viable solution in the 
context of a nation presented as an "imagined community"32 and build on an 
ideological cumulation with a primary role in maintaining societal cohesion. 
In this way, the following quasi-axiom regarding identity is validated:  "as 
soon as the identity aspects are crystallized at cultural level, the national 
identity is no longer perceived as a result of the material and symbolic 
processes, but as a cause of them."33 
The Serbian historic right to Kosovo, which was virtually denied by 
the content of the plan developed by the former Finnish leader, was the main 
argument used by serbophiles to illustrate the thesis of a state created by 
NATO. The geopolitical component was to be fuelled by the fact that 90% of 
                                                          
31 Ibidem, pp. 61 - 62. 
32 Sergiu Gherghina, Vasile Boari, Radu Murea, op. cit., p. 18. 
33 Ibidem, p. 19. 
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the bombing on the air bases and the Yugoslav military targets were 
performed by the USA.34 Serbia's position on Kosovo was mainly a mixture 
between a hard-to-establish ratio between Yugo-nostalgia,35 identity 
protection and purely strategic interests, thus noting the interpenetration of 
"living national pride"36 and geopolitical equations. The opponents of these 
cumulative determinants – especially Richard Rorty's vision on this issue – 
were to describe the "counterproductive character of the identity policies 
perceived as a diversion from the real economic problems, a policy of 
Balkanisation and rejecting of the universal moral norms".37 
 
The Creation of a Second Albanian State in Southern Serbia  
 
Partially reiterating the episode of the Montenegrin independence, the 
Kosovars declared their independence on February 17th, 2008, following an 
extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly from Pristina. Kosovo's 
Declaration of Independence is a four-page response to the Ahtisaari Plan, 
the authors stating that it "fully accepts its obligations for Kosovo",38 
declaring itself a "democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic." Kosovo's 
actual independence can be seen as a strategy almost in the mirror with the 
                                                          
34 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2015, p. 245. 
35 Fedja Burić, “Dwelling on the Ruins of Socialist Yugoslavia. Being Bosnian by 
Remembering Tito”, in: Maria Todorova, Zsuzsa Gille, Post-Communist Nostalgia, New 
York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2010, p. 230.  
36 Vasile Boari, Sergiu Gherghina, Radu Murea, op. cit., p. 151. 
37 Ibidem, p. 78. 
38 Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Kosovo Declaration of Independence, Pristina, 
February 17th,  2008, available at http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/common/docs/Dek_Pav_e.pdf , accessed on April 29th, 2018, p. 4. 
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Montenegrin one; the only difference is that the authorities from Podgorica 
legitimized their decision through public consultation. 
The text of the Declaration stipulates even a commitment to the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, which constitutes an element of 
originality compared to the typology of such a document, especially because 
it accepts the provisions of the former Finnish President as a whole. Another 
element that does not fit into the common logic of a declaration of 
independence – but which was fully justifiable at the time it was proclaimed 
– is the reference to Euro-Atlantic values, underpinned by the peace and 
security commitments that have become the leitmotifs of the UN system. 
The text also presents Kosovo as one of Yugoslavia`s successor states, 
stipulated in the passage addressing the obligations of the Republic of 
Kosovo. The authors of the Declaration had doubled UNMIK's commitments 
on behalf of Kosovo by mentioning the status of a successor republic, 
residing in the quality of "former constituent party"39 of Yugoslavia. The 
message, beyond the international commitments that statehood implies, was 
largely related to the desideratum of placing of the most recent Balkan actors 
on equal footing with their neighbours in the region. Therefore, the call for 
equality between the Republic of Kosovo and its neighbours meant, beyond 
the strictly declarative component, an appeal to the international community 
to press in this direction, anticipating Serbia's vehement opposition to 
Kosovo`s independence. 
A comprehensive response to the unilateral act of Kosovo`s 
independence came from the Holy See, with representatives of the Vatican 
                                                          
39 Ibidem, p. 4.  
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State stressing – after recalling their involvement in crisis management and 
humanitarian assistance – the implications the process might have – in this 
case, a problematic relationship with Serbia. As a result, Federico Lombardi, 
General-Manager of Radio Vaticana, pleaded for direct negotiations between 
Belgrade and Pristina, with a view towards reaching a consensual solution40 
to Kosovo's legal status. The same communiqué issued by the Vatican also 
explained that the relationship between the ethnicities in Kosovo must be 
closely monitored, thus confirming the validity of the hypothesis describing 
the possibility of mirroring the 1999 events. In the alternative, we find the 
same message of the intrinsic link between safeguarding the identity right of 
the Serbian minority and the internal cohesion of the Republic of Kosovo. 
One of the main challenges of a country founded on jus sanguinis was 
the "naturalization of ethnic consciousness",41 with the direct result in a 
biological-genetic formation of historical materialism. The concerns of the 
international community, synthesized in the communiqué sent by 
L'Osservatore Romano, firstly targeted the unacceptable symbiosis between 
citizens, statehood, sectarianism and the objective of turning the imagined 
community into a country project. Also noticeable is the Holy See`s exposé 
analysing the "need for recognition and respect"42 in terms of stimulating 
nationalism, thus validating the conceptual distinction between patriotism 
and nationalism made by Madeleine Albright: the first one expresses the 
                                                          
40 Federico Lombardi, “A proposito della dichiarazione unilaterale di indipendenza del 
Kosovo”, L'Osservartore Romano, Vatican, 18th – 19th February 2008, available at 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/osservatore-
romano/it/comments/2008/documents/042q01b1.html, accessed on April 29th, 2018. 
41 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, After authority: war, peace, and global politics in the 21st century, 
New York, State University of New York Press, 2000, p. 110. 
42 Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2009, p. 49. 
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natural attachment to the country, while the latter is an acute form of 
revanchism. 
Belgrade's major challenge was to align with the expectations; worth 
mentioning here is the popular characterization of Kosovo being a "state 
created by NATO", compounding upon its perceived neo-merchantilism.43 
According to Serbia, the Kosovar independence was not a strict regional 
attribute based on the right to self-determination, but corresponded to Euro-
Atlantic interests that could be defended only by the self-determination of 
Kosovo. As a consequence, the serbophile discourse maintained that the 
Western attitude on Kosovo is the result of "the intersection of West-
European and North-Atlantic economic interests".44 The position also 
illustrates what is characterized as "the defeat of consciousness by 
nationalism",45 the idea of the shadow of the future signalled by Harrison, 
questioned by the burden of the past and the Balkan nightmare evoked by 
Drakulić. The public Serbian discourse finally displayed the effects of the 
great crises of Balkan history, but also the circumspection regarding the 
fundaments of the new order. 
The separation of the international community into two currents – 
serbophile and kosovophile – is the real consequence of "the ambivalence of 
public support",46 as Clark stated during the war. Titus Livius`s assumptions 
about the Punic wars, that of conflicts structurally related to the stability of 
the great balance of power, is decisive for understanding the position of both 
camps. So it is, finally, a confrontation between the artisans of maintaining 
                                                          
43 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, op. cit., p. 129.   
44 Traian Valentin Pocea. Aurel I. Rogojan, op. cit., p. 396. 
45 Slavenka Drakulić, op. cit., p. 60 
46 Wesley Clark, op. cit., p. 19. 
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the status quo and the forces of the movement that want to make changes, 
perceived by the first category as being able to modify the power relations. 
In South-Eastern Europe, given the diminished size of the countries 
compared to the international scene, the entry of any actor means the 
alteration of a fragile traditional balance, especially when undergoing the 
recurrent Balkanisation. The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia has 
brought back the "revival of the power policy",47 leading to situations such 
as the limited external protectorate, which is decisive for synthesizing the 
Belgrade-Moscow axis. Serbia and the Russian Federation, the traditional 
prominent actors in the region, have coalesced what we might call a binomial 
to safeguard the traditional relations in the Western Balkans, the main 
objective being the obstruction of Kosovo’s independence. 
The strategic affinity is decisive for the redefinition of relations 
between Belgrade and Moscow, reactivated after the Titoist non-alignment 
ideology became part of recent history, just like Yugoslav federalism. Serbia's 
direct experience with NATO, underpinned by the Kremlin`s profoundly anti-
Alliance character, provided one of the strongest grounds for rejecting the 
validity of the ideas of consensual and anti-sovereignty48 raised by Robert 
Kaplan when analysing the dichotomy between the old and the new Europe. 
From a certain point of view, the paradox of NATO's expansion to the East, 
doubled by the human rights doctrine highlighted by crisis management, has 
been a catalyst for Panslavism.  
                                                          
47 Ioan Mircea Pașcu, The Battle for NATO. Personal Report, Bucharest, Rao Publishing 
House, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 57. 
48 George Cristian Maior, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Traditionally influential in South-Eastern Europe, Russia can also be 
seen as an integrated component of the regional phenomenon generically 
designated as Balkanization, an issue that overstated the interactions between 
the European liberal democracy and the irrational Balkan nationalism.49 The 
paradox is the following one: safeguarding the values born during 
Enlightenment that built Western democracy as it is nowadays was achieved 
through the medieval concept of a just war. The immediate effect was quite 
controversial, especially among the Serbian and pro-Serbian public 
segments, the two accusing the West of neo-imperialism as a result of what 
they call "NATO`s expansion after the austerity of the Cold War".50 
In contrast, the violence that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
also determined Brussels`s active involvement in the Adriatic, via 
mechanisms such as the Stability Pact or the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements. Although promises for European integration were going to 
encourage the reconciliation, testing Serb reactions after the proclamation of 
Kosovo`s independence demonstrated Belgrade's portrayal of the 1999 war 
as the "shame in Kosovo".51 Serbia`s tendency towards self-deprivation for 
the way the last of the Yugoslav conflicts ended was also noticeable. The idea 
of "shame" also puts into question hypotheses such as the international 
community`s misbehaviour in Serbia, thereby the idea of the West 
humiliating Belgrade. 
                                                          
49 Dušan I. Bjelić,  “Introduction: Blowing Up the ‘Bridge’”, in: Dušan I. Bjelić, Obrad Savić 
(eds.), Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation, Massachusetts, The 
MIT Press, 2002, p. 10. 
50 Fareed Zakaria, op. cit., p. 197. 
51 Vesna Goldsworthy, “Invention and In(ter)vention: The Rhetoric of Balkanization”, in: 
Dušan I. Bjelić, Obrad Savić (eds.), Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and 
Fragmentation, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 2002, p. 51.      
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There were also voices that extended the discussion beyond the 
strategic limit, resulting in the theory of an "orthodox Belgrade-Bucharest-
Moscow axis",52 whose validation is rather partial, as the foundations of such 
a trinomial were quite different. First and foremost, it was that both Romania 
and Russia had faced quasi-conflictual ethnic relations, with problems that 
persist even now at the level of the interactions between the minority and the 
majority. There existed, however, some sort of strategic affinity, built on the 
"Romanian-Yugoslav Brotherhood” and on Panslavism. For Romanians, 
Serbia was, after the Republic of Moldova, one of the neighbours with whom 
the relations were among the friendliest, with many sectoral co-operations 
and collaborations inherited since communist times. For the Russians, the 
position of the "higher Slavic brother" has always been a determining factor 
for Serbia's socio-political proximity, with the confessional component 
having a more or less predominant role, depending on the optics of analysis. 
The inherent realism of anarchy53 evoked by Jonathan Mercer 
overlapped the Serbian claims for blocking Kosovo`s independence, in an 
attempt to regain what geostrategic language calls the heartland.54 At the 
same time, we could notice that the geopolitical extrapolation of homo homini 
lupus is the establishment of a causal link between globalization and the 
decline of nationalist sentiment: the more globalist a state, the less 
nationalistic it became. However, the opponents of this conceptualization 
also discuss specific issues such as the decline of authority and state 
                                                          
52 Viorel Roman, The Transition from the Romanian Revolution of 1989 to the Yugoslav War 
of 1991, Bucharest, Nova Publishing House, 2000, p. 22. 
53 Alexander Wendt, op. cit., p. 242. 
54 Othon Anastasakis, David Madden, Elizabeth Roberts, “Introduction: The Past is Never 
Dead...”, in: Othon Anastasakis, David Madden, Elizabeth Roberts (eds.), Balkan Legacies 
of the Great War: The Past is Never Dead, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 10. 
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autonomy. For Serbia, Kosovo's independence was the most eloquent 
example of this dynamic geared towards global governance, but mainly 
grounded as "interference" in domestic affairs based on the doctrine of human 
rights. 
 
Serbia`s Allies within the European Union  
 
Belgrade's coalitions of the wills against Kosovo`s independence 
were mainly pursued on two target groups: the traditional allies of Serbia or 
the states facing similar problems and which were, therefore, deeply 
interested in not having the Kosovo precedent as a winning cause. Greece 
was the actor that fully complied with the above-mentioned conditionalities, 
adding two more elements with the potential of deepening the rapprochement 
with Serbia: Greece was an overwhelmingly Orthodox state with an 
overwhelming majority of ethnic Greeks, facing Albanian separatism in 
Southern Epirus, with strong fears of reiterating the situation in Kosovo. 
Athens` concerns were fuelled by the more or less well-grounded 
hypotheses that exposed Tirana's involvement in Kosovo, even before the 
conflict broke out. Given the traditionally problematic Albanian-Greek 
relations, the fear that the territorial integrity of the Greek state could be the 
subject of a joint action, the Pristina-Tirana rapprochement led to Greece`s 
alignment to the Serbian position, especially since the Turkish minority in 
Greek territory was not deprived of separatist voices, therefore the 
acceptance of Kosovo’s independence could bring major domestic problems 
for Athens. The Greek interests went so far that the recognition of Kosovo`s 
separatism meant the de facto recognition of Turkish separatism from 
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Cyprus, one of the strongest tensions between Athens and Ankara after the 
status of the Turkish minority from the Hellenic Republic. 
 A theatre for a secessionist war without frontiers, Cyprus joined the 
pro-Serbian side, together with Greece, motivated both by the position of the 
mother state and by the direct experience with Turkish separatists in the 
northern territory. Since the international community – accused of "fictitious 
character"55 – rallied to the cause of separatism and not to the state authority 
mandated to hold and use the monopoly of violence, the North-Cypriot 
separatism was inherently acknowledged. As this aspect was unacceptable to 
the Greeks from the Balkans and Levant, the traditional Athens-Nicosia 
binomial decided to adhere to the serbophile movement, advocating major 
suspicion on the international system`s real capacity for guaranteeing state 
integrity 
For the Greeks and for the Cypriots, the situation was even more 
alarming as Turkey had given strong support to the Muslims from the 
Balkans, in particular to the communities from Albania and Bosnia, the first 
one being directly interested in the developments from Kosovo. In 
conjunction with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), Ankara`s support 
for Kosovo's self-determination was perceived as a stage of Neo-
Ottomanism,56 thus maximizing Turkish influence in South-Eastern Europe 
using the soft-power component. The thesis affirms, even if episodically, the 
idea of Belgrade as a "cultural decontamination centre",57 supporting what 
                                                          
55 Colin S. Gray, op. cit., p. 269. 
56 Rahdam Adeni, “Being Muslin in the Balkans: Tracing the Past in Modern Times”, in: 
Ayşe Zişan Furat, Hamit Er (eds.), Balkans and Islam: Encounter, Transformation, 
Discontinuity, Continuity, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2012,  p. 
117. 
57 Viorel Roman, op. cit., p. 22. 
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the pro-Serbia side saw as an integrated stage of establishing a Muslim 
macro-state in the Western Balkans, an entity that would bring together 
Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, as well as the Muslim-inhabited territories from 
Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, or Montenegro. 
Switching back to Serbia, Kosovo`s separatism could have been a 
starting point for a mirror solution in Vojvodina, with the Hungarian 
separatism known in the region. Belgrade was also worried about losing this 
last autonomous province, which was still in administration, especially in the 
context of strong concerns over Hungary's support for the lax central control 
of Bratislava in the region. The Hungarian minority component was to bring 
Serbia's new ally into the process of building up coalitions of will to oppose 
Kosovo's statehood: while Belgrade faced the Albanian separatist movement, 
Bratislava faced the Hungarian one, practically two mirror examples of the 
same desideratum of building ethnic states. Slovakia is a European actor 
formed by the secessionist or central-eastern style – depending on the school 
of thought the adherents of the ideology prefer – which has been confronted 
since the very beginning with the separatism of the Hungarian minority. In 
the case of Bratislava, the fact that the Slovak state is the result of a velvet 
divorce, thus of a mutually accepted separation, is regarded as bestowing 
legitimacy upon minorities with secessionist or irredentist claims. 
At regional level, Bosnia-Herzegovina's opposition to the Kosovar 
independence was motivated by internal reasons: the recognition of Kosovo's 
Declaration of Independence would lead to the recognition of separatism in 
Republika Srpska. As the territorial integrity of the post-Dayton system was 
profoundly challenged internally and externally, the Parliament in Sarajevo 
had not ratified Kosovo`s independence act, invoking reasons of foreign 
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policy: Bosnia’s relationship with Serbia was quite problematic in the sense 
that Serb separatism was supported by Belgrade, so a benevolent attitude 
towards Pristina could cause Serbia to react by encouraging the Serb minority 
from Bosnia to put its separatism into practice.    
However, Spain remained the speaking-tube of the anti-Kosovo 
camp, the Iberian kingdom having the most aggravating problems in terms 
of the relations between the minority and the majority, with the most 
pronounced independence movements. Recognizing a precedent of statehood 
built by secessionism was undesirable in the context of transmitting the most 
inappropriate message to the Spanish regions aspiring to create their own 
state. The deepening fears of the Government from Madrid have led to 
supporting the Serbian status quo, but especially to the formation of the group 
of five EU Member States that did not recognize Kosovo. The level of 
relations between Brussels and Pristina was thus limited because there could 
not be a legal base, especially because "the EU never recognized Kosovo as 
a state".58 
The opponents of Kosovo`s independence also evoked arguments 
such as "helping neoliberal policies with the new aggressive forms of [neo] 
imperialist intervention".59 There were also accusations such as those of Peter 
Hallward, which describe a "lack of ideas to overcome the impasse [...] 
                                                          
58 Wolfgang Koeth, Bosnia, Kosovo and the EU: Is Accession Possible without Full 
Sovereignty?, Maastricht, EIPA Maastricht, 2012, available at 
http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/20120710143924_WKO_Eipascope2012.pdf
, accessed on April 30th, 2018, p. 33. 
59 Slavoj Žižek, Agon Hamza, From Myth to Symptom: the case of Kosovo, Pristina, 
Kolektivi Materializmi Dialektik, 2013, p. 76. 
RJHIS 5 (1) 2018  
 
 
 
65 
 
chauvinism [...] monstrous political impotence [...]".60 The attributes describe 
a pre-modern61 state, as presented by Robert Cooper: incapable of controlling 
its own territory, lacking the mechanisms capable of securing order, 
sovereignty rather nominal than explicit. Kosovo is thus presented as terra 
nullius, with the interpretation that independence has been given to a territory 
that escapes the influence of the state's power. 
Also outstanding is the metaphor describing the province as an 
"Achilles' heel"62 for Serbia, exposing the strategic component of the whole 
issue: after Kosovo`s independence, Serbia had lost some of its South-
Eastern border with Montenegro, more than half of the border with 
Macedonia and even Albania's neighbourhood. Besides Vojvodina, Serbia 
currently has problems with separatist minorities in Sandjak and Preševo 
Valley, both inhabited by Muslims, with the second one populated by 
Albanians. The Kosovo precedent sent, more from anything, a consistent 
message, to the separatists in the two provinces, but especially to those in the 
Preševo Valley, known for expressing the desideratum of joining Kosovo, 
insurgencies part of their regional reality. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Belgrade's fierce opposition to Kosovo's Declaration of Independence 
is explicable according to neorealist logic, that of safeguarding the heartland, 
and that of foreign policy as an extension of internal politics, as argued by 
                                                          
60 apud Peter Hallward, The Politics of Prescription, Durham, Duke University Press, 
volume 4, 2005, p. 769. 
61 George Cristian Maior, op. cit., p. 39. 
62 Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, op. cit., p. 401. 
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Carl von Clausewitz. The Serbian position also reveals the opposition to the 
1999 military intervention that led to the international tutelage, presented 
today by its critics as illegitimate, interference which eventually led to the 
formation of a state. From a certain point of view, the idea of the "recalcitrant 
nation"63 can be discussed, but with exclusive reference to the rejection of 
the Ahtisaari Plan. 
The independence, resulting from a conflict developed in the logic 
that the structuralists designated "the third interwar decade", has reinstalled 
Balkanization as a specific phenomenon in South-Eastern Europe, which, in 
the end, was carried over to the international community. The last of the 
Balkan conflicts that led to the explosive disintegration of Yugoslavia also 
transferred Balkanization into the UN system, divided by its attitude towards 
the young Republic of Kosovo. 
In essence, the Kosovar issues could be considered a maturity test for 
the Serbian state, especially because the Yugoslav wars were reminiscent of 
the interwar decades when the Serbian state reappeared after centuries of 
belonging to Austria-Hungary. The beginning of the 21st century marked not 
only the reduction of the Serbian state to its ethnic nucleus, but also the chain 
reaction of self-determination, this time inside Serbia: from the Montenegrin 
independence to the Kosovar one, Serbia was once again in the situation of 
defending its territories and disputing its historical right.  
 Last but not least, in terms of soft power, Serbia lost its cradle of 
civilization and was thus reduced to the territories majorly inhabited by the 
Serbs, with the exception of Preševo Valley. Extrapolating, Kosovo had 
                                                          
63 Fareed Zakaria, op. cit., p. 52. 
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Montenegro as a precedent, thereby there are growing concerns that Preševo 
could have both of them as examples. The Kosovar independence is different 
from the Montenegrin one: if separatism originating from Podgorica only 
meant the failure of the Yugoslav federalism, the separatism led by Pristina 
meant a maturity test for the Serbian statehood. As a result of the right to self-
determination born out of the interwar period, Serbia today faces the 
implication of the post-Cold War interpretation of the same right, also 
augmented by the doctrine of humanitarianism.      
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